Product · Policy

Rules that know what the agent read.

Permissions say what an agent may touch. Decision Horizon's policy also asks what it has seen. A write to a public folder is fine, until the agent has read a secret.

Why it matters

The gap it closes

Identity and access controls answer "is this agent allowed to write here?". They can't answer "should it, given what it just read?". That's where prompt injection does its damage.

What it does

Capabilities

Rules in dh.toml or Cedar

Write rules in the config, or in a real Cedar policy file. Hard rules block; soft rules pause for a human.

Horizon-aware

Conditions can use what the agent has read, not just the target, so a secret in view changes what it may do next.

Taint by value

Content that reaches a call's arguments is detected from the bytes, across sessions too, not guessed from file names.

Human checkpoints

Send a soft-deny to a webhook: Slack bot, ticket system or your own UI. The record keeps the hash of exactly what the approver was shown.

Safe defaults

Anything explicitly not granted is blocked, expired authority is blocked, and unknown tools escalate to a human instead of running.

No silent approvals

An unreachable approver is recorded as no human consulted, and the action is blocked.

Get started

In practice

From the documentation.

[[policy.rules]]
id = "public_write_with_secret_in_horizon"; tier = "soft"
action = ["write_file", "edit_file", "move_file", "copy_file"]
when = { targets = "*pub*", horizon = "*secret*" }
Stated limits

What it doesn't do

  • An approval endpoint is your component. The record writes "the approval endpoint reported", never "a human decided".

See it on one of your own workflows.

We'll put Decision Horizon in front of a real agent workflow of yours and replay the record with you.